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Chapter Seven
Neoliberal Instrument Choice
David M. Driesen
Economic theory has profoundly influenced policy‐makers’ thinking about the
selection of instruments to effectuate environmental policy goals. And this
thinking about the economics of instrument choice has powerfully influenced
United States climate change policy, leading the United States to strongly
support environmental benefit trading as an instrument of climate change policy.
This chapter will discuss this influence. It begins with a basic explanation of
emissions trading, a form of environmental benefits trading, and a short
summary of its history. It then recounts the United States’ embrace of
unrestrained international environmental benefit trading as a climate change
remedy and how this influenced U.S. and international climate change policy. It
closes with some analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the United
States’ posture in this regard.
Economists have long lamented traditional regulation’s inefficiency,
referring to it pejoratively as “command and control” regulation (an epithet
embraced by many non‐economists as well).1 They have recommended either
pollution taxes or emissions trading in order to remedy this inefficiency, with
most of them tending to prefer taxes.2 President Clinton at one point proposed
employing an energy tax to address climate change, which would create an
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incentive to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, the principal greenhouse gas.
But the rejection of government that Professor Schroeder has described carried
with it an extreme aversion to new taxes, and Congress would not support such
a tax. Hence, anti‐governmental attitudes played a role in limiting even the
choices among instruments that economic thought commends.3
In the climate change arena economists’ second choice environmental
instrument, emissions trading, gained much more traction. It fit in reasonably
well with the prevailing free market ethos and seemed to some policy‐makers to
offer an alternative to government regulation. Accordingly, a brief explanation of
emissions trading and its history will prove useful.

I.

Emissions Trading Described

United States law often relies on uniform performance standards as a means of
meeting environmental goals.4 Such standards require all firms within an
industry to reduce emissions by an amount that the government chooses. This
leaves firms with some technological flexibility, as polluters may choose any
technology that meets the regulatory limit.5 But it requires each regulated unit
within a facility to meet the government‐specified target. It is spatially specific
regulation.6

4
Economists consider uniform performance standards inefficient. A
uniform standard does not produce uniform costs among regulated facilities.
Indeed, facilities within an industry commonly encounter widely varying
compliance costs when meeting a uniform target. This implies that an industry
could meet the same aggregate reduction demanded through a uniform standard
more cheaply if facilities facing high marginal control costs made fewer
reductions than the uniform standard demands and those facing lower marginal
control cost made more reductions than the uniform standard demands.
Unfortunately, government officials rarely have sufficient marginal control cost
information to fine‐tune regulation to match each facility’s cost structure. Indeed,
governments employ uniform standards precisely because they allow officials to
regulate large groups of facilities without having to tailor regulation to each
firm’s circumstances.
An emissions trading approach allows the owners of regulated facilities
themselves to shift around their pollution control obligations to achieve the least
cost allocation of emission reductions. An emissions trading scheme begins with
a government regulator setting a uniform standard, just as with traditional
uniform performance standard. But when the regulator uses trading, she
authorizes owners of pollution sources to forego a required reduction if they pay
other polluters to make extra reductions in their stead. Given the opportunity to
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trade around compliance obligations in this manner, polluters with high local
marginal control cost will presumably forego local reductions and pay somebody
else for extra reductions instead. Conversely facilities with low marginal control
costs will make enough extra reductions to sell them to facilities that would
otherwise face high marginal control costs. The polluters themselves rearrange
their reduction obligations to achieve the goal the regulator has set for the
industry as a whole at lower cost than would happen if each regulated entity met
a uniform target. This approach rather ingeniously allows for efficient fine‐
tuning of regulation without the government having to tailor regulation to each
facility’s special cost situation.
Trading proponents often claim that emissions trading stimulates
innovation more effectively than traditional regulation.7 Innovation consists of
the development and use of a new technique or idea.8 The idea of newness, an
idea at the heart of our concept of innovation, implies that for a technology to be
innovative, it must involve a non‐obvious departure from prior art. We do not
innovate when we employ a pollution control technique that has been used
many times before in a new plant or even a new industry (at least if the
applicability is obvious). We innovate when we advance the state of technology
by doing more than just making obvious incremental refinements. The end of
this chapter will examine the claim that emissions trading more effectively
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stimulates innovation than traditional regulation. Whatever the claim’s merits, it
is certainly congruent with market glorification. Indeed, a competitive market’s
capacity to stimulate innovations bettering our lives constitutes perhaps its most
widely admired feature, as evidenced by the laudatory press Apple has received
for introducing the iPod. The claim that emissions trading produces superior
incentives for innovation helps clothe it with the luster some see in markets
generally. This claim is also important to trading’s utility in addressing climate
change. Scientists now believe that avoiding dangerous climate change will
require massive emission reductions, which entails the abandonment of fossil
fuels over time.9 Abandonment of fossil fuels implies a need to innovate to
develop cheap and effective substitutes. Innovation can create these substitutes
thus making abandonment of fossil fuels technically, economically, and
politically feasible. The claim that emissions trading effectively stimulates
innovation implies that it stimulates substantial movement in the right direction
over time, i.e. that it provides a strong impetus to develop technologies capable
of substituting for fossil fuels. This claim suggests that emissions trading
provides the sorts of economic incentives that will produce a positive economic
dynamic. The economic dynamic framework suggests that the suggestion that
trading might optimally stimulate innovation is more important than the largely
uncontested static efficiency claim for emissions trading.
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II.

Experience with Emissions Trading

The United States began experimenting with emissions trading in the late 1970s
and President Reagan’s Administration greatly amplified this trend. The trading
programs introduced greater “flexibility” into implementation of the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments by allowing facilities to escape various reduction
obligations if they provided an alternative reduction, usually from a different
unit within the same facility. Thus, one unit would use another unit’s reductions
to offset its emissions. Air pollution experts refer to these early programs as
“bubble” programs, because they treated facilities as if they were encased by a
giant bubble.10
These programs produced very large cost savings, but often these savings
came from evasion of pollution control obligations.11 The program facilitated
evasion of reduction obligations because of two fundamental flaws. First, EPA
allowed states to apply the bubble approach to pollutants that could not be well
monitored.12 Second, EPA did not insist that states cap the emissions of the
facilities generating credits. Indeed, the law did not cap the emissions of the
facilities purchasing credits either, but it did usually subject them to limitations
of their emissions rates.13 Credits excusing compliance with a local emission limit
could be realized through just about any pollution reduction project involving
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the traded pollutant. The combination of poorly monitored pollution and the
lack of caps created enormous complexity that led to lost emission reductions.
The evasions this project‐based structure encouraged merit a little
explanation, as similar problems may arise in the climate change context. One
problem involved giving up an emission reduction at a regulated facility on the
basis of a credit reflecting no additional pollution reduction. For example, Virginia
encouraged siting of a new petroleum refinery within its state by offering it
pollution reduction credits that the highway department realized when it
switched asphalt formulations. This asphalt switch occurred for economic
reasons having nothing to do with pollution control regulations. Without
trading, the reduction from the asphalt switch would still have occurred and the
refinery would have been required to greatly reduce its emissions and offset the
remainder under the Clean Air Act. Because of the trade, the refinery claimed a
credit for the asphalt switch and avoided having to reduce its emissions and
offset its residual emissions. Thus, the trading caused a loss of emissions
reductions that would have occurred had there been no trading for the asphalt
credit. Other evasion examples include the “phantom” credits generated by
facilities that had shut down; the facilities died but the pollution control credits
lived on. Of course shutting down a facility does reduce its emissions. But unless
demand slackened, another facility would probably ramp up production and
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increase emissions to make up for it. But as no cap existed on the mass of facility
emissions, this pollution increase would not be accounted for. Phantom credits
justified giving up reductions otherwise required under the Clean Air Act,
usually without producing a real net reduction in its stead.
President Reagan embraced emissions trading as a piece of his “regulatory
reform” program, promising less government and more reliance on markets. In
this context, he was loathe to recognize that the market he established lacked
environmental integrity. And his regulatory reform staff put out reports
glowingly praising the “cost savings” the bubble programs had produced, while
glossing over the loss of emission reductions otherwise provided for under the
Clean Air Act.
The acid rain program that followed, however, would prove more
successful. By the end of the 1980s, the acid rain problem had achieved the sort of
prominence that global warming achieved around 2006. Regulation seemed
inevitable. Both the electric utilities and the Bush Administration (the elder
Bush) hoped that Congress would employ a flexible cost saving emissions
trading approach to regulation of the sulfur dioxide emissions causing acid rain.
They won over the more technocratic environmental groups, such as the Natural
Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense (then called the
Environmental Defense Fund), by capping the mass of regulated facilities’
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emissions at levels that offered a significant environmental improvement and by
generally requiring regulated sulfur dioxide emitters to employ continuous
emissions monitors. The combination of a cap and air‐tight monitoring
persuaded technocratic environmentalists that the program would achieve
worthwhile goals and ultimately produced the first successful emissions trading
program. The program produced the planned reductions quite reliably (indeed
early) and significant cost savings. The emission decreases reduced deposition of
sulfur dioxide into ecosystems significantly. Reduced deposition, however, did
not cure the ecological problem, which had become quite serious during the
years when regulators failed to seriously address it. But it is likely that a non‐
trading program would likewise have failed to completely cure the ecological
problem. Only an enormously stringent limit, whether achieved by trading or
not, would do that. Overall, the acid rain trading program was a clear success.

III.

Trading and the Climate Change Regime

As the acid rain trading program took shape, the United States began to
participate in the climate change negotiations that would produce the
Framework Convention on Climate Change and ultimately the Kyoto Protocol.
President Bush took a stance fully in keeping with free market ideology,
opposing caps on emissions, but supporting trading. This stance ignored the

11
lessons of the acid rain program, which showed that caps are essential to the
success of the trading program. And this approach ignored the lessons of the
bubble programs, which suggested that project‐based trades tended to facilitate
evasion of reduction obligations. The United States consistently touted the
success of the acid rain program as showing that all emissions trading must be a
good idea, thereby ignoring the rather more nuanced and richer lessons a
reasonably complete history of emissions trading might offer about program
design.
The United States’ position on trading during the 1990s and the first years
of the 21st century remained basically unchanged. The United States wanted
broad international environmental benefit trading, not confined to countries
willing to cap their emissions or to activities that could be well monitored. I use
the term “environmental benefit trading” here, rather than emissions trading,
because of the extreme breadth of the United States position. The United States
wanted credits for actions that did not reduce emissions at all, but instead
ameliorated climate change by enhancing ecosystems’ capacity to act as a carbon
sink, absorbing carbon emissions that would otherwise contribute to global
warming. For example, the United States wanted credits for tree planting, since
trees absorb carbon dioxide. While the acid rain program succeeded in part
because it focused on a single pollutant amenable to reliable monitoring, the
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United States advocated trades among a basket of greenhouse gases, lumping
together those that could be well monitored with those that could not. In this
respect, the U.S. in essence took a position that could duplicate the failure of the
bubble program, which focused mostly on an entire category of poorly
monitored gases, volatile organic compounds.
This trading über alles (everywhere) position reflected a triumph of
economic ideology over sound regulatory practice. Even during the Clinton
Administration this position continued to command the allegiance of the federal
government. While President Clinton himself was not an ideologue, his
Administration was well aware that the free market ethos remained very
influential in Congress. The Administration hoped that its trading über alles
position would help it win over Republican Senators who liked markets, but
detested regulation.
From a free market perspective, this trading position made perfect sense.
The broadest possible market maximizes liquidity and trading’s cost savings
potential. Thus, this position enjoyed considerable support among both
economists and legal academics influenced by the law and economics movement.
From a legal perspective, the position raised considerable concerns. It
seemed to ignore the lessons of the bubble experience— that programs reaching
poorly monitored activities or relying on project‐based credits from noncapped
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sources tended to produce evasion of reduction obligations, rather than simple
cost effective rearrangements of those obligations.
This position, moreover, troubled delegations from other countries.
Representatives of the European Union repeatedly expressed concerns about the
environmental integrity of the U.S. approach. They fought hard to limit
environmental benefit trading’s role in the climate change regime and to build in
safeguards to maximize its integrity. Developing countries had even more
fundamental concerns about emissions trading. Their representatives tended to
view emissions trading as a means of allowing developed countries to escape
their moral obligations to address climate change domestically. During climate
change negotiations, they frequently noted that developed countries had created
this problem, and that they should therefore solve it. And generally, that meant
that developed countries should reduce their own emissions. Developing
countries’ representatives also expressed concerns about trading programs
making their future participation in addressing climate change difficult and
expensive. Developing countries expected that they eventually would have to
deliver emission reductions of their own. If developed countries, who would go
first, met their reduction responsibilities by buying up credits in developing
countries, the cheap opportunities would be gone when developing countries
began their to reduce emissions later in the 21st century. Hence, the trading über
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alles position created considerable international tension and greatly complicated
ongoing efforts to construct an effective climate change regime.
The United States neoliberal instrument choice position, whatever its
technical merits, had an enormous impact on the evolving climate change
regime. At the insistence of the United States, the Framework Convention on
Climate Change provided that countries could achieve the Convention’s aim,
stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels, individually or “jointly.” The parties to
the Convention probably understood this reference to “joint implementation” as
authorizing trading, at least among countries agreeing to aim to stabilize
emissions. At the United States’ request, the Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP) authorized a series of “pilot
projects” designed to test the efficacy of international emissions trading during
the years between the enactment of the Framework Convention and the
completion of the Kyoto Protocol to that convention. Although these projects
yielded no clear results and no meaningful evaluation, the United States,
predictably in light of the ideology prevailing in Washington, insisted on
building broad environmental benefit trading into the Kyoto Protocol.
The extreme United States position almost caused the negotiations leading
up to the Kyoto Protocol to collapse. The combination of a trading über alles
position and a refusal to accept meaningful caps infuriated delegates from many
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countries. Yet, an agreement seemed impossible without the effective
participation of the United States, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter.
Finally, the Clinton Administration sent Al Gore, a long‐time supporter of
climate change action, with instructions to broker a compromise. Then Vice‐
President Gore helped broker an agreement that committed the United States to
7 per cent reductions below 1990 levels in exchange for an agreement to very
broad environmental benefit trading.
Largely, as a result of the United States position, the Kyoto Protocol
contains no less than three emissions trading programs. Only one of these
programs limits trades to developed countries with caps. The other two are
“project‐based mechanisms” that have more in common with the bubble
programs than they do with the acid rain program. The first program, Joint
Implementation (JI), allows trades with countries (nationals of countries) in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The second project‐based program,
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), authorizes trades between
developed countries (or their nationals) and developing countries. The CDM
proposal came from the Brazilian delegation, but its creation and adoption reflect
all parties’ concern that the United States be brought on board, and the United
States strongly supported Brazil’s proposal.
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The parties to the Kyoto Protocol recognized that these instruments,
especially the project‐based ones, raised significant problems of monitoring,
accounting, environmental integrity, and international coordination.
Accordingly, many of the post‐Kyoto negotiations have focused on developing
governance structures and ground rules for the trading programs. The CDM
created the most serious accountability issues, so it generated the most elaborate
structures and rules. The COP created a CDM Executive Board consisting of ten
country representatives with relevant expertise to oversee CDM implementation.
Its duties include approving methodologies for measuring or estimating
emission reductions and reviewing individual projects’ compliance with ground
rules. The CDM also certifies “designated operating authorities,” which must
estimate the credits a project is supposed to generate and then verify that they
actually did produce these credits. In practice, these bodies usually are private
consulting firms paid for by project developers. In addition, the host county must
approve projects generating credits in its territory. The Kyoto Protocol requires
that CDM projects advance sustainable development. The post‐Kyoto
governance structure assigns the determination of sustainability to host country
governments.
One key ground rule, which is stated in the Kyoto Protocol itself, forbids
granting credits for projects that do not provide “additional” emission
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reductions. This rule clearly aims to avoid some of the abuses that afflicted the
bubble programs. But it’s not an easy rule to administer properly. The regime
also creates a process for expert evaluation of credits for sink protection, which
remains extremely controversial, partly because of the difficulties in predicting
how much carbon reduction value a particular project will generate. These rules
provide examples of the many matters that arose because of environmental
integrity concerns stemming from the U.S. position and its acceptance in the
Kyoto Protocol.
This presentation of the CDM regime does not do justice to its complexity,
but it suffices to show that the United States’ insistence on broad trading has
generated a complex set of institutions and rules. Some JI projects require an
approval process similar to that governing CDM. Some can undergo a simpler
process. Overall, the project‐based mechanisms have created vast potential for
avoiding emission reductions and with it, a complex set of rules and procedures
to try and limit the potential damage.
Even though the international community put in all of these trading
programs largely to satisfy the United States (and a few of its allies), the United
States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. failure to ratify the Protocol
meant that it could only go into force if another climate skeptic, Russia, ratified
it. Russia agreed to ratify the Protocol in exchange for a deal that gave it a lot of
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emission credits to sell. These “hot air” credits reflect no actual program to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, these credits reflect the decline in
Russian emissions that accompanied post‐1990 economic collapse. If Russia sells
these credits, then developed countries purchasing the credits can appear to meet
their Kyoto targets without actually reducing emissions.
As we have seen, George W. Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol outright,
in spite of all of the elaborate provisions seeking to cater to Washington’s
neoliberalism. In other words, after forcing a shotgun marriage between
sustainable development and market liberalism, the United States left the bride
at the altar.
But the bride soldiered on. The European Union (EU) had been a skeptic
of emissions trading and had spent years trying to craft an effective carbon tax
regime in keeping with economists’ teachings. Faced with an international
architecture favoring emissions trading and doubts about whether it could craft
an effective carbon tax regime in light of concerns about competitiveness and free
trade, it decided to implement an emissions trading scheme. While most analysts
refer to this as a cap and trade regime, that characterization is too simplistic. The
scheme does require EU member states to cap the emissions of certain large
greenhouse gas emitters, such as coal‐fired power plants. But it authorizes the
sources of capped emissions to purchase credits from pollution sources that are
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not operating under a cap. Indeed, the EU Linking Directive specifically
authorizes member states to credit reductions realized through the Kyoto
Protocol’s project‐based mechanisms to the accounts of their regulated facilities.
This means, in effect, that this program can lose emission reductions if the
project‐based mechanisms have integrity problems similar to those that occurred
under the project‐based bubble programs. The United States trading über alles
position ultimately led polities historically quite skeptical of free market
extremism to embrace rather broad liberal trading, along with some of the risks
to environmental integrity that such a stance implies.
In spite of the Bush Administration’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol,
climate change law has begun to emerge in the United States. Many states have
come to the conclusion that they simply must act to ameliorate the dangers that
climate change poses for their people. California, for example, has become
alarmed about the prospect of droughts and other disturbances that climate
change promises, and has begun active planning on how to both manage the
disasters it can no longer avoid and to do its part to ameliorate climate change
itself. And a number of Congressmen have introduced a variety of bills in
Congress to address global warming; only President Bush’s likely veto kept a bill
from passing in 2007.
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Both the major programs in the most important states to address global
warming and the bills pending in Congress rely heavily, and often exclusively,
on environmental benefit trading to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These
laws (whether enacted or proposed) vary widely in their scope of coverage and
the in the amount of emission reductions they demand. But to a remarkable
degree, they all contemplate near total reliance on the trading mechanism.

IV.

Analysis

Emissions trading does offer an opportunity to cost effectively achieve
environmental goals. And the acid rain program has shown that emissions
trading, if properly designed, can be effective at achieving some environmental
goals. Nevertheless, love of free markets has led the United States to
overestimate the value of emissions trading, to underestimate the importance of
good design, and to a failure to seriously consider more ambitious alternative
economic incentives.

A. Efficiency over Efficacy: The Problem of Overly Broad Design
One major problem with free market ideology’s influence over U.S. climate
policy involves the direction of trading design. Too much market love may push
regulators to design programs too broad for effective enforcement. In this
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connection, it’s helpful to remember that emission trades generally do nothing to
advance environmental protection. Decisions about caps by regulators can
advance environmental protection. The trades, at best, reallocate the reductions
required under a cap in order to reduce their costs. There’s nothing wrong with
this, rearranging obligations to reduce costs can be desirable. But economists,
brokers, and sometimes even regulators sometimes evince confusion on this
point. They write about how cap and trade programs “automatically” produce
emission reductions and often evaluate programs using a more is better metric;
many trades mean a successful program and few trades indicate failure. The
notion that trading “automatically” produces emission reductions is utter
nonsense. Trading relies on basically the same mechanisms that traditional
regulation uses to generate emission reductions, regulatory decisions about the
amount of reductions to require and heavy penalties for non‐compliance. Thus,
the first phase of the European Union’s emissions trading scheme failed to
produce any real progress, because the caps European regulators set were lax.
Most importantly, the amount of trades has no relationship to the environmental
success of a trading program. Lots of trades can indicate lots of fraud or lots of
cost savings while goals are being achieved. It all depends upon whether the
credit generating activities have in fact made extra emission reductions of equal
value to those foregone by the sources purchasing the credits. And conversely,
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conformance with the cap without trading will meet the program’s underlying
environmental goal.
Free market ideology’s view of markets as spontaneously generating
benefits, tends to obscure the relationship between credit generation and
environmental quality in an emissions trading program. In a properly
functioning emissions trading market, every time a polluter makes an extra
reduction to sell into the market, a purchasing polluter raises its emissions above
the amount otherwise required. Polluters, unfortunately, have an economic
incentive to exaggerate the value of credits and to understate the value of
debits—the amount of under‐compliance they financed with a credit purchase.
Environmental goals can be realized with few trades or lots of trades. The key
question from a regulatory perspective is not whether a lot trades occurred, but
whether the credits traded really were at least as valuable as the debits.
Increasingly, evidence suggests that the broad trading approach the
United States has lobbied for has produced lost emission reductions.14 Emission
reduction losses arise when projects lack “additionality” – when credit is
awarded for projects that would have reduced emissions even if no polluter had
paid for the credit. There is some evidence that the CDM Executive Board has
approved projects that differ little from the asphalt project we described above.
In one case, it approved a solar energy project for credit, even though the

23
financing was in place long before the possibility of CDM credits existed. The
problem is that as long as those purchasing the credits pay some money for
them, and a tiny portion of that money reaches those developing the solar
project, the project developers can claim that the money was essential to the
project’s completion. These claims should be regarded as correct when the
money earned for the credits account for a very high percentage of the project
cost. But such claims appear dubious when the credit revenue accounts for a
very low percentage of the project cost, which has been the case with respect to
many projects.15 Renewable energy presents a political problem for the CDM
Executive Board. If the CMD Executive Board applied a strict additionality test to
relatively expensive projects like many renewable energy projects, it’s possible
that no renewables projects would generate credits.16 To appreciate that this
should not be seen as a problem one must view the trading mechanism
analytically, not as magic. If the board disapproves of credits when credit
purchases account for a small portion of project revenue, there’s a good chance
that the project will be built without credit, and therefore without an increase in
emissions in the country purchasing the credits. Thus, denial of credits will not
cause a loss of renewable energy or other environmental benefit. Under the CDM
Executive Board’s current approach, we often give up reductions in Europe
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because of reductions elsewhere that would have occurred even if there had been
no credit purchased.
All of these problems arise because of the project‐based design. A true cap
and trade program would produce good overall results in spite of effects like
these. But in a project‐based program, these sorts of issues can result in lost
emission reductions. Hence, the U.S. approach has increased the risk that the
emission reductions countries have committed to making will not, in fact, be
realized.

B. International Political and Institutional Problems
The potential shortfall in emission reductions could directly worsen climate
change, but it also poses a more potent indirect risk. As we have seen, countries
like China and India have so far refused to agree to emission reductions. While
they accept the Framework Convention’s principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, they believe that developed countries should clean up before
they are asked to do so. In future climate change negotiations, they will prove
more amenable to reduction commitments if it’s clear that developed countries
have met their responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol’s
embrace of virtual compliance—compliance based not on physically achieving
targets within the country assuming the target, but upon claims about reductions
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realized elsewhere—may make claimed compliance non‐credible. This could add
to the larger problem that the United States has created by not trying to comply
at all. If the largest emitter did not comply and developing countries have doubts
about whether the climate leaders in Europe really complied as well, it may be
hard to reach effective agreements to reduce worldwide emissions.
On the other hand, the assumption of these risks has led to the
development of governance institutions designed to contain them. Indeed,
creation of expert bodies addressing some of the emissions trading issues under
the Kyoto Protocol represents an advance over both of the institutional structure
governing the bubbles and most, if not all, international environmental law
regimes, which often contain weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms or
none at all. While advances in institutional structure have continued, so far they
do not seem to have made up for the deficiencies of such a large complicated
system.
Ample reasons exist for some measured skepticism. The CDM Executive
Board has disapproved some projects and reduced the credits claimed for others,
so there is evidence that it is willing to counteract some inflated credit claims
from project developers. Yet, it may find application of a very strict additionality
test politically difficult, as such a test leave popular measures like solar energy
out of the CDM, thereby improving its integrity, but diminishing its luster.
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Project developers generally pay the designated operating authorities to evaluate
project, so notwithstanding the CDM board’s accreditation procedures, conflicts
of interest may lead designated operating authorities to exaggerate credits or
seek certification of dubious projects. And developing country national
governments have largely played little role in overseeing CDM projects, which is
what resource restraints would lead one to expect.
In spite of all of this, there are some forces limiting the damage potentially
coming from Kyoto’s overly broad trading schemes. Russia has not undermined
the scheme by selling lots of hot air credits to date. This may reflect decisions on
its part that it may profit more by waiting, but it also may reflect a widespread
perception that the public in Europe would not accept the use of such credits to
undermine Kyoto compliance.
Economic thought has been the driver for assuming these sorts of risk
through overly broad trading programs. For economic thought has helped lead
the United States to a position seeking the broadest possible trading in order to
make sure that private polluters could use the cheapest possible credits for
compliance purposes. The possibility that the cheapest credits might prove
problematic or fraudulent has had only a minor influence on federal policy,
although it has influenced some of the emerging state law more seriously. The
Northeastern states, for example, have crafted a Regional Greenhouse Gas
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Initiative, which features some numerical and qualitative restraints on project‐
based credits in order to minimize bubble‐like problems. In general, love of
markets and a lack of serious concern for effective government have led the
United States to focus far too much attention on efficient use of private sector
resources, and not nearly enough on cost effective use of very limited
government resources. Broad trading programs can exhaust government
resources by multiplying the number and types of transactions that government
must monitor in order to assure the legitimacy of any one claimed emission
reduction.

C. Tradeoffs Between Static Efficiency and Long‐Term Innovation
Advocates of trading programs under the Kyoto Protocol have predicted that it
would create incentives to maximize deployment of renewable energy and
energy efficiency. These claims amount to an assertion that emissions trading
creates the right economic dynamic.
So far, however, the data from the CDM indicate that emissions trading
under the Kyoto Protocol has mostly stimulated end‐of‐the‐pipe controls, not
fundamental changes in energy infrastructure. At first glance, this data suggest
that emissions trading has stimulated renewable energy and energy efficiency, as
most of the projects involve these sorts of measures. But a more careful analysis
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suggests much more emphasis on end‐of‐the‐pipe approaches than on renewable
energy or energy efficiency. End‐of‐the‐pipe approaches have generated the
lion’s share of credits available in the market.17 And the number of credits
generated provides a more reliable measure of how most reductions get
generated. Indeed, HFC control projects alone, which have the potential to
stimulate emission increases, generated almost half of the total Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) credits generated so far.18
The graph below reflects the distribution of credits sold thus far under the
Kyoto Protocol’s CDM.19It shows end‐of‐the‐pipe controls’ predominance with a
relatively small percentage of credits produced by renewable energy and energy
efficiency.20
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Distribution of Total CDM Credits Issued Through July 18, 2007
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If one examines somewhat less reliable numbers for projects “in the pipeline”
(i.e. not yet fully‐approved) for CDM only, renewable energy credits rise to about
25% by 2012.21
Trading also has done absolutely nothing to stimulate nuclear power,
which, while controversial, some see as a necessary element of a future largely
free of dangerous climate change. The European Union does not allow its
polluters to use nuclear power credits to satisfy their obligations under its
emissions trading scheme. But even without this prohibition in place, nuclear
power is too expensive to finance with revenues derived from those seeking low
cost abatement.
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These results reflect only the early experience with emissions trading
under the Kyoto Protocol. The European Union has just completed phase one of
a two phase emissions trading scheme that will produce much of the demand for
CDM credits. The second phase will be stricter and could change this picture
somewhat, but the credits generated so far reflect the market’s anticipation of
phase two to some degree.
The experience with broad emissions trading contrasts strikingly with the
experience with narrower approaches. Most European countries and several
states in the United States have adopted programs aimed specifically at
stimulating renewable energy. The most successful programs employ a type of
subsidy called a “feed‐in tariff” that guarantees renewable energy providers a
high price for the energy they produce. In the United States, as we have seen,
renewable portfolio standards are more common. Both have been far more
effective in stimulating renewable energy than broad‐based emissions trading.
There is little evidence that maximizing short term efficiency through adoption
of the broadest possible emissions trading program stimulates innovation more
effectively than a narrower approach aimed directly at the innovation objective.
The evidence that emissions trading stimulated great reliance on
conventional approaches and little fundamental change is consistent with the
experience in the United States acid rain program. That program produced no
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renewable energy. Instead, utilities complied predominantly through reliance on
two of the oldest best understood methods for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions,
scrubber installation and use of low sulfur coal. To be sure, the program did
stimulate some innovation. It stimulated some advances in scrubber design that
won patents, which suggests some innovation. And some analysts described
utilities use of dispatch orders to maximize use of cleaner units as an innovation.
But the most thorough review to date of innovation under the acid rain program
and its non‐trading predecessors addressing the same pollutant from the same
sources found that emissions trading produced less innovation than traditional
regulation. And we have already seen that the bubbles produced a lot more
evasion of pollution control obligations than innovation.
A program we have not yet examined, the lead trading program, did
produce fundamental change. But this program required that small refiners
phase out lead entirely. It’s quite clear that the same phaseout requirement
without trading would have produced the same fundamental change. Indeed,
the lead banking program delayed the phaseout somewhat.
Furthermore, the economics literature on trading increasingly expresses
skepticism about trading proponents’ assertion that lead provides better
incentives for innovation than a performance standard of identical scope and
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stringency. Certainly, it does not reflect the unanimity that prevails with respect
to assertions about trading’s static efficiency.
Market worshipping policy‐makers just assume that trading must
stimulate innovation better than traditional regulation of identical stringency and
scope. But this assumption rests upon a fallacy. It assumes that only emissions
trading creates markets, and that traditional regulation does not. This
assumption is not correct. A traditional performance standard requires
reductions in emissions. Once such a standard is established, companies pay
contractors, vendors, and/or employees to evaluate pollution control methods
and to purchase and operate pollution control technologies. A performance
standard makes pollution expensive. Once one is promulgated, continuing to
pollute at current levels can lead to heavy fines. It therefore creates economic
incentives to clean‐up and a market in technologies capable of assisting in that
process. This does not necessarily mean that traditional regulation does a great
job at stimulating innovation either. Indeed, while traditional regulation has, at
times, stimulated significant technological innovation, it often has not done so.
Unfortunately, our knowledge traditional regulation’s stimulation of innovation
remains woefully incomplete, because of a dearth of post‐compliance studies.
But the presence of some innovation both in trading and non‐trading contexts
means that the question of whether emissions trading stimulates significant
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innovation more effectively than performance standards do is a lot more
complicated than many of its proponents have assumed. The tendency to glorify
markets has led many in the neoliberal era to treat emissions trading as a
panacea with respect to innovation.
A subsequent chapter will address the question of whether we can do
better, and if so, how. Emissions trading’s poor track record in stimulating
innovation does not necessarily mean that competing mechanisms do better. It
does, however, mean that the question of whether we get more innovation by
either redesigning emissions trading programs or making use of alternatives
merits more discussion than was possible when the neoliberal view dominated.

Conclusion
Glorification of markets has led the United States to favor broad environmental
benefit trading. This position led to a climate change regime largely based on this
model. The neoliberal instrument choice and design model, however, creates
risks of losing planned emission reductions, various institutional failures, and
inadequate stimulation of innovation.
None of this means that emissions trading is a poor idea. Indeed,
emissions trading constitutes one of the more useful contributions of economic
thought to environmental policy, since a well‐designed program can cost
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effectively reduce emissions. But the assumption that just because emissions
trading lowers short‐term costs, broad environmental benefit trading must be the
answer to the climate change problem merits further analysis, which I will
provide in a subsequent chapter.
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